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Abstract
With national electricity systems, ‘transition’ may involve decentralising production and ownership, and digitalising the
system. These processes are facilitated by smart metering, ‘prosuming,’ and changes in consumer behaviour. Driving fac-
tors may be national steering, or the process can be left to the market. In Norway, the government has opted for tightly
steered national coordination of three key areas: national smart-meter implementation (since 2011), prosumer regulation
(since 2016), and a national end-user demand flexibility regulation (expected to be adopted in 2020). These regulations
influence production patterns, energy flows and grid activities. Drawing on organisational fields theory, this article asks:
Why was it decided to adopt these policies centrally? Which actors have had greatest influence on policy outputs? And,
finally, what of the possible implications? The regulations, developed in a sector in a state of field crisis, have generally
been supported by the relevant actors. The Norwegian case can help to explain incumbent roles and field crisis, as well as
nuanced drivers in complex transitions, beyond decarbonisation.
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1. Introduction
The electricity sector is a crucial area for fulfilling climate
targets, along with wider transitions deemed necessary
to achieve ‘deep decarbonisation,’ where the scope of
the transition goes well beyond single technologies and
sectors, to achieve society-wide and larger-scale emis-
sions reductions (Geels, Sovacool, Schwanen, & Sorrell,
2017; Schot & Kanger, 2018; Sovacool & Walter, 2019).
Despite extensive national variations in efforts and re-
sults based on factors like historic production portfolios,
sector structure and stakeholder interests, and resource
endowments, the role of policy has proven important, as
have other factors that are shared drivers in these elec-
tricity sector transitions (Meadowcroft, 2009; Roberts &
Geels, 2018; Rosenbloom, Haley, & Meadowcroft, 2018).
Smart electricity meters, prosuming (whereby house-
holds and small firms consume and produce electricity),
and flexible electricity use at the consumer level all play
distinct but interrelated roles in electricity-sector tran-
sitions (Ballo, 2015; Inderberg, 2015; Inderberg, Tews,
& Turner, 2018; Skjølsvold, Throndsen, Ryghaug, Fjellså,
& Koksvik, 2018). Energy transition can be understood
generally as “change in the composition (structure) of
primary energy supply, the gradual shift from a specific
pattern of energy provision to a new state of an en-
ergy system” (Smil, 2010, p. vii). However, electricity tran-
sitions today play out in different ways in connection
with various drivers and resistances. Although usually
driven by political factors (Moe, 2017), an electricity tran-
sition should not be seen as one unified development
or direction. It involves interrelated transitions in pro-
duction and consumption patterns, grid activities, digi-
talisation of the electricity sector, the electrification of
new sectors, and, usually, decarbonisation. Actually, en-
ergy transitions should be seen in the plural, embrac-
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ing various trends and directions, involving a range of
actors (often with opposing interests) at several levels.
This facilitates an understanding of transitions as non-
unitary, contested pathways that require analytical dis-
integration to be comprehended.
Conceptions of energy futures tend to be contested
and are influenced by more and less covert interest con-
flicts. Here I apply an organisational fields perspective
to three key policies in order to explain the direction of
Norway’s ongoing electricity transitions, drawing primar-
ily on data from public policy documents, reports, and
hearings. I ask why it was decided to adopt these poli-
cies centrally, and which actors have had greatest influ-
ence on policy outputs. I also discuss whether there has
been a movement from a centralised towards a more
decentralised system. The three policies studied here
are the adoption of the nation-wide smart meter pro-
gramme in 2014, the national prosumer regulation from
2016, and the consumer flexibility tariff from 2018 (with-
drawn) and 2020 (pending political decision). These poli-
cies are arguably among the most important ones of the
past 20 years in determining the degree of current and fu-
ture decentralisation of theNorwegian electricity system.
Ever since the early 1900s, Norway has had a traditional
electricity system based on publicly owned hydropower;
however, it has demonstrated the ability to change and
was among the first countries to liberalise its electricity
sector in 1991.
Norway has opted for firmpolitical steering of several
processes for transitioning its electricity sector, although
politically mandating tightly-reined national steering is
not warranted. Other countries have chosen various
solutions. For example, New Zealand, Sweden, and
Switzerland—small countries with a high hydropower
share in their electricity mix—have taken differing paths
with lighter governmental steering, perhaps with the
partial exception of Sweden for smart metering. New
Zealand, dominated by hydropower and roughly com-
parable in size to Norway, has a voluntary, market-
based approach to smart-meter rollout. Sweden had na-
tional smart-meter implementation with limited meter
functionality in 2009, followed by a recent renewal of
all meters—also politically mandated, and resembling
the Norwegian programme. Thus far, Sweden has not
mandated an end-user flexibility policy, but the need
has been officially recognised. Finally, Switzerland does
not have a national programme but has several grid-
company-level programmes for smart metering. These
variations in approachwarrant closer analysis, where the
Norwegian case can shed light on how system structures
change and why, in the face of assumed vested interests.
The selected policies all represent key interventions
likely to condition future developments relating to the
development of the electricity system—in particular,
whether or not steps are being taken toward greater
decentralisation.
The centralised–decentralised dimension has numer-
ous interpretations (Judson et al., 2020). ‘Centralised’
and ‘decentralised’ are often relative and descriptive
terms referring to electricity production, grid and con-
sumption structures, and are as such physical—but they
can also reflect control over (parts of) the system, own-
ership, or other aspects (Bauknecht, Funcke, & Vogel,
2020). Here I relate this dimension primarily to produc-
tion, energy services and electricity management issues,
briefly touching on influence structures. While I do not
take a normative stand as to what would represent the
‘best’ system structure, the policies studied here all en-
able new balances along this key dimension, and, in
my view, represent some movement towards a decen-
tralised system.
2. Theoretical Perspective and Case Selection
The organisational field perspective (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012) is well-suited for shedding light on the
interest dynamics within a field or sector. It is useful for
explaining changes in dominant interests and perspec-
tives, and ultimately on policy output and institutions
(Wooten, 2015).
2.1. Organisational Fields
The electricity sector, like any organisational field, is
an area of institutionalised life that includes govern-
ment and industry, as well as other relevant stakehold-
ers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). It is characterised by a
shared regulatory framework, as well as relatively con-
sistent patterns of domination and subordination (Scott,
2008). Whereas the regulatory framework may originate
from different bodies and levels of administration, an or-
ganisational field represents a system of actors, actions,
and relations where actors take each another into ac-
count as they conduct interrelated and interdependent
activities (McAdam & Scott, 2005). In addition to formal
rules and regulations, also shared values, norms, and
conventions develop within the field; however, I focus
on the formal rules and interests. Many organisations,
public as well as private, are involved in operating and
governing Norway’s energy systems, with actors on the
political (ministries, individual politicians) and industrial
levels, and NGOs or consumer interests.
Established organisations within the field will of-
ten work to keep or enhance inherited formal struc-
tures (Thelen & Streeck, 2005), as it is at the field
level that institutions (including regulatory structures)
are established, maintained, and changed and disrupted
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). When there is stability,
field strategic games are played, to place actors in a
favourable future position (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).
In stable fields, changes are usually incremental, but
fields tend to exist in one of three states: emergent, sta-
ble, and crisis (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Emergent
fields lack institutionalised regulatory and normative
structures, and stable fields are more established, with
a settled structure. A field crisis typically occurs when es-
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tablished structures, often held in place by incumbent ac-
tors, become challenged by external or internal events or
new actors, perhaps leading to transitions and new sta-
ble states (Koehrsen, 2018). New challenges may include
technological developments, external political pressure,
internal rising actors, or other pressures currently on-
going in national electricity sectors. It is likely that the
three policies studied: a) are shaped in accordance with
the incumbent interests in Norway’s electricity sector; or
b) stem from external or internal events, challenging the
established power structures. In the first case, we expect
that current incumbents have wanted national policies
in the areas analysed here, and have influenced them
to secure regulation in accordance with their interest.
As the incumbents are dominant actors in control of a
traditional electricity system, little change in terms of de-
centralisation is to be expected. In the second case, the
situation can be identified as a field crisis, where chal-
lengers to the current structure have had clear influence
on policy outcomes. This represents a shift in the sector
and may lead to a more decentralised pathway.
2.2. Case Selection and Empirical Data
The cases have been chosen because they repre-
sent particularly important policies for the centralised/
decentralised dimension of the Norwegian electricity
sector. Such official policies or regulations define key
premises for subsequent policies, regulations, and sector
behaviour, and therefore also pathway direction. Inspired
by ‘anchoring practices,’ the conceptual notion of a hi-
erarchy in practices that ‘anchors’ and sets premises
for other and subsequent practices (Inderberg & Bailey,
2019; Swidler, 2001), understanding the cases as ‘anchor-
ing policies’ relates also to their relative place in regula-
tory complexes, where they strongly shape subsequent
regulation. Path change would also entail adaptations in
the anchoring policies. The role as dominant premise-
setters makes them key arenas for vested interest con-
flicts within the sector, and useful as analytical units. This
means more effective case selection, perhaps at the cost
of technical nuances and reduced empirical richness.
The policies for smart metering, prosuming regu-
lation, and demand-side response tariff are related,
but separate approaches that all represent such
premise-setters. Smart metering enables later possi-
bilities, although their potentials are as yet unrealised.
Prosuming—household production of electricity for own
use and occasional export of surplus—has been slow to
emerge in Norway, but it represents an emerging trend
and a possible challenge to the traditional production-
grid-consumption model (Inderberg et al., 2018). Finally,
demand-side response in the form of a grid tariff is cur-
rently being planned.
This study rests primarily on document studies relat-
ing to official reports, academic articles, and official pol-
icy documents on the development of the policies under
scrutiny. All hearings and hearing statements connected
to the development of these policies have been inves-
tigated, providing important sources for categorising ac-
tor standpoints, actor constellations and contestation of
different viewpoints. Individual hearing statements have
been collected, processed, and analysed according to
views expressed. Given the brief format of this article,
the presentation of the hearing statements is necessar-
ily somewhat superficial. For each topic, several hear-
ings have been held, with response submissions ranging
from 5 to 84 (see Table 1). In the presentation of the
results, I have partially conflated several hearings, nar-
rowing them down to those that led to the final regula-
tion, while still seeking to present differences and devel-
opments between the hearings. Narrowing down to the
‘most important’ hearings (indicated in Table 1) does not
mean that small technical changes are necessarily unim-
portant, but here the focus is on more general trends
and viewpoints.
While the implications of any policy can often be
interpreted in several ways, and the consequences are
not always as intended, the policies selected for analysis
here are generally assumed or even officially intended to
contribute to greater digitalisation, enabling new tech-
nical solutions, facilitating decentralised production of
electricity, and encouraging flexibility in electricity con-
sumption. The official policy goals are described under
each policy.
In addition to the hearing documents, the data in-
clude official reports and legal documents, as well as
research literature. The main basis for the analysis is
the hearing documents, including the official proposal,
hearing letters, and submissions by relevant actors. In
principle, any legal entity (including private individuals)
may submit hearing responses. Thus, there is some self-
selection involved in the empirical material, favouring
organisations and individuals with sufficient interest in,
competence, and capacity to submit a response.
3. Three ‘Centrally Decentral’ Policies
Norway’s electricity system is already fully renewables-
based. The share of wind power is increasing and is ex-
pected to reach 10% of electricity production by 2021,
with the remainder produced almost exclusively by hy-
dropower. Transnational interconnectors are important
for securing supply in years with low precipitation, as
well as for export purposes. This leads to a unique situ-
ation where the electricity system itself is not in need of
decarbonisation, andwhere stored hydropower provides
flexibility. While Norway is not a full member of the EU,
it is an EEA member, and must transpose most EU regu-
lations relating to the electricity sector.
Highly visible in the hearings are the traditional
electricity-sector actors. The grid utilities—about 130
in Norway—are dominant here, ranging in size from
730,000 end-users and down to fewer than 5,000. The
largest companies (Hafslund Nett, Eidsiva Nett, BKK Nett,
Agder Energi Nett, Skagerak Energi Nett, Norgesnett)
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Table 1. Hearings: Main elements and overview.
Start Regulatory
hearing Main topic Specific topic hearing Responses change implemented
2008 Smart metering Proposed change in smart-meter 48 Conceptual hearing—no
regulation change planned
2009 Smart metering Hearing on the decision await 37 Decision to await EU
the European Commission group developments for
M/441 work, to align standards standardisation
2011 * Smart metering Main hearing with proposal for 65 Regulations adopted in full
smart-meter definitions, metering
requirements, billing
2013 Smart metering Short deadline, proposal to 5 Two-year postponement of
postpone roll-out smart-meter implementation
2014 * Prosumer regulation Changes in control metering 46 Regulation adopted with
regulations minor modifications
2015 Prosumer regulation Additional hearing (short deadline) 27 Regulation withdrawn
on net metering of prosumers for following political
support scheme instructions from
government
2015 Flexible tariffs Conceptual hearing exploring 57 New hearing (as planned)
(demand-side overarching principles and
management) potential models
2018 * Flexible tariffs Proposal for tariff model 81 Proposal withdrawn; new
(demand-side ‘subscribed capacity’ proposal for hearing in 2020
management) (postponed several times)
2020 Flexible tariffs To be launched n.a.
(demand-side
management)
Note: * Main policy decision round.
supply the majority of end-users in Norway with elec-
tricity, and all these companies have submitted sub-
stantial statements to the hearings examined here. The
smaller grid companies vary in geographical area and
localisation: a bouquet of organisations ranging from
those with one or two employees, to larger and more
professionalised enterprises (Inderberg & Løchen, 2012).
Energy Norway is the dominant interest organisation,
representing some 300 companies that produce, trans-
port or deliver electricity—companies that cover 90% of
Norwegian end-users. Defo is an interest organisation
representing producers and grid companies in rural ar-
eas, with 68 member companies. Lastly, KS Bedrift rep-
resents the municipalities as significant owners of en-
ergy companies.
The next actor group is the newer entrants in the
electricity sector, with companies like Otovo, Solenergi
FUSen, and Solcellespesialisten. These are represented
by the interest organisation Norwegian Solar Energy
Society (Solenergiforeningen), with about 500 organisa-
tional and private individualmembers. At hearings, these
are frequently accompanied by representatives of associ-
ations like the interest organisation for electric vehicles,
EVNorway. In addition, some of the larger entrepreneurs
and housing companies, like the NBBL and OBOS, fre-
quently side with others in this group.
The last group of actors are the NGOs and some
consultancy companies. Of the NGOs, Zero, Bellona,
and Friends of the Earth Norway have submitted state-
ments to all hearings. Then there are consultancies like
Multiconsult, which work to spread information about
electricity, control systems, and new modes of produc-
tion like PV, while also having their own interests.
3.1. National Smart-Meter Implementation from 2014
In Norway, smart meters offer two-way communication
that measures consumption at regular intervals (15 min-
utes) and reports hourly. This includes a remote control
element, for limiting or shutting off supply (Inderberg,
2015). The meters can provide accurate information to
the consumer and billing for real consumption, as well
as activation and de-activation of supply; and they can
facilitate limited private household generation of elec-
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tricity and feeding into the grid. They are generally seen
as a necessary step towards smart grids and effective
demand-side management, and as contributing to grid
digitalisation, enabling new options for managing con-
sumption patterns and energy services.
Unlike some other countries, including large states
under EU regulation like Germany (Meister, Ihle,
Lehnhoff, & Uslar, 2018) and the UK (Sovacool, Kivimaa,
Hielscher, & Jenkins, 2017), Norway has adopted and
implemented a complete, nationally-adopted roll-out
of smart meters with specific technical requirements,
replacing all electricity meters in the country. Here
Norway was later than frontrunners like Italy, Sweden,
and Finland, but this later adoption enabled coordi-
nation with European technical standards for meter-
ing. Although these are important markets that the
Norwegian electricity sector must relate to (Inderberg,
2015; Zhou & Brown, 2017), there was significant
national room for leeway. Annex I to the Electricity
Directive 2009 (which is binding for Norway) requires
EU member-states to implement electricity smart me-
ters for 80% of consumers by 2020, unless the result of a
cost–benefit analysis is negative (EU, 2009). This has led
to considerable variation in approaches within the EU in
terms of meter requirements, degree of state steering,
and meter share of end-users. Norway’s smart-meter
regulation involved a compulsory rollout for all meters,
where technologically advanced minimum requirements
and open standards were established for these meters.
To date, three brands of meters have been delivered,
from the companies Aidon, Kaifa, and Kamstrup.
Prior to the hearings, the Norwegian Water
Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) issued three
reports, mapping the feasibility of implementing smart
meters (NVE, 2004a, 2004b, 2006). They all concluded
that smart metering was not economically feasible. This
view had some support among the grid companies, but
they were far from unified. Around 2006 the main grid
utilities began to favour a national roll-out (Inderberg,
2015), as indicated by a report commissioned by the pre-
decessor to Energy Norway—EBL—which argued that
full national implementation could be feasible (ECGroup,
2006). Thereafter, the idea gained political traction.
After further scopingwork, four public hearings were
held on smart metering: in 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2013—
and most of the dynamics centred on these. In addition,
there have been working groups that included technical
experts, often with experience from or representing the
electricity sector. The 2008 hearing mapped principles
for functionality, financing, and implementation, as well
as several other issues (NVE, 2008). The second hearing
(NVE, 2009), was held in order to delay certain decisions
concerning technical functionality, so as to align with the
work of the European Commission in this area. The main
hearingwas the third one, held in 2011: It decided for full
regulation (NVE, 2011b, 2013). The fourth and final hear-
ing concerned postponement of roll-out, but no further
changes. Analysis of the three first hearings is included in
the empirical material, presented together here for rea-
sons of space.
In all, 65 responses were received to the main hear-
ing in 2011. The majority (40) represented the tra-
ditional electricity sector, mainly the grid companies.
Submissions also came from meter producers, a few
municipalities, and other relevant public actors; like-
wise from Zero as well as Friends of the Earth, to-
gether with Bellona (representing the NGO sector), and
from the Association for Electricity-Sensitive Individuals
(FELO) (NVE, 2011a). The statements overwhelmingly
supported the installation of smart meters, with the
clearest exception of FELO. Several actors, including
the Consumer Council and the Consumer Association,
brought up concerns relating to their areas. Some grid
companies queried how to define real-time readings, but
no other submissions touched on this.
Several submissions (including those frommeter pro-
ducers) discussed requirements for IP-based communi-
cation with external units for feedback to the consumer.
In the final regulation, this was altered to not specifying
technology for communication, but with a recommenda-
tion for open standards. Several submissions—including
those from most grid companies, public authorities like
the Consumer Council and the Data Protection Agency—
focused on data protection, and on limiting third-party
access to data.
Some grid companies (but far from all), as well as the
threeNGOs, brought up the need formetering prosumer-
generated electricity to be exported to the grid. This was
supported by some grid companies, whereas others fo-
cused on security issues related to this point.
The final regulation requires full national implemen-
tation, data measuring enabled for every 15 minutes, ac-
tual data measurement every hour, data frequency col-
lection every day, and a physical interface to give in-
stant access to consumptiondata to the end-user.Meters
must also allow remote disconnection and load limita-
tions, and allow for transmission of power prices, tariffs,
and steering signals to the consumer (THEMA Consulting
Group, 2015b, p. 11).
Thesewere themost important signals from the hear-
ing rounds. However, it should be borne in mind that the
full process also involved a series of meetings between
the NVE and these actors, primarily regarding the techni-
cal scope and implications of the potential design of the
regulation (Inderberg, 2015).
3.2. The Prosumer 2016 Regulation
Prosuming is frequently seen as a step towards a more
decentralised electricity sector (Bauknecht et al., 2020).
Until 2010 prosuming was not formally permitted in
Norway: Anyone legally producing electricity and feeding
into the grid would have to register as a power plant. In
2010 theNVE created exemptions from themetering and
control regulations, explicitly opening up for private pro-
suming (THEMA Consulting Group, 2015b). The stated
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purposewas to acquire experiencewith prosuming, with
the aim of developing a full regulation. The NVE an-
nounced a prosumer regulation for hearing in 2014. This
involved two hearings, with one following in 2015. The
chief topic of the 2014 hearing was the general scheme
for prosuming: The main aspects of prosuming, particu-
larly legal definition, tariffing, and access to the green
certificates support scheme (NVE, 2016a):
With this proposal, a prosumer was legally under-
stood to be an end user with consumption and pro-
duction of electricity on the consumer side of the me-
ter, and where the electricity fed exported to the grid
at any time does not exceed 100 kW. (NVE, 2014, au-
thor’s translation)
In addition, a prosumer could not engage in production
or trade behind the meter that would require any form
of license. Here I focus on the 2014 hearing, as it largely
determined the shape of the regulation.
The 46 submissions were divided on several dimen-
sions. First and foremost, no actors officially opposed
the legal opening for prosuming. Energy-sector interest
groups and actors, primarily grid companies, were ac-
tive here.
The most contested area was the definition of ‘pro-
suming’ (NVE, 2016a), especially regarding the 100 kWp
limit on feed-in capacity. The grid companies as well as
Energy Norway, Defo, and KS Bedrift argued that the
100 kWp limit was too high. Energy Norway argued for
the limit be lowered to 10 kWp, in order to link prosumer
activities more closely to private households. Defo ar-
gued that some rural grids might not be dimensioned to
receive this amount of capacity, whereas KS Bedrift was
more open to this arrangement.
On the other side was the broader group consisting
of NGOs, entrepreneurs and housing associations, and
consultancies/research actors like Multiconsult and NCE
Smart EnergyMarkets. They called for a clearer technical
explanation of the need for the 100 kWp limit for qualify-
ing as a prosumer; several actors considered that limit to
be arbitrary and wanted it removed. An additional argu-
ment was that companies and owners of larger buildings
could adapt their systems to this limit, thereby designing
economically sub-optimal installations.
Housing association issues were another topic that
was mentioned, but only by a few NGOs, some new
entrants, entrepreneurs, and Multiconsult. They found
it problematic that housing associations should be re-
stricted as regards utilising prosuming as a collective ar-
rangement: In building compounds, each individual flat
represents an end-user, but, as shared metering is gen-
erally not allowed in Norway, these end-users cannot
trade amongst themselves or collectively. This, it was
stressed, significantly weakened the potential to expand
prosuming within this type of dwelling. That point was
not mentioned by the traditional energy actors or their
interest organisations.
The last main issue in this hearing concerned cost dis-
tribution, relating to the tariff structure. According to the
announcement of the hearing for this regulation, con-
sumption from the grid would be priced as for all ordi-
nary consumers. Consumption of self-generated electric-
ity would be ‘free’: No tax or other charge would apply
under the proposed regulation. In addition, prosumers
would not have to pay the feed-in grid fee required of
ordinary producers.
The rurally focused Defo was critical to exempting
prosumers from the feed-in grid fee. Part of the argu-
ment concerned the distribution of costs, as prosumers
would be exempt from contributing to parts of grid main-
tenance expenses. That argument has been heard in, for
instance, Germany (which has a significantly higher share
of prosuming in its system), but was not mentioned by
the other hearing partners. No national goals for prosum-
ing were set.
In a Nordic energy market outlook report from 2019,
the NVE predicted approximately 7 TWh by 2040 as a re-
alistic potential for solar energy (NVE, 2019). That is the
only official prediction of solar potential found.
3.3. The Power-Based Tariffing (Demand Flexibility)
Regulation
The official goal of demand flexibility is to achieve more
effective utilisation of the grid by moving some of the
load away from peak times. A tariff structure reflect-
ing power demand (capacity use) over energy (kWh) is
often seen as the cornerstone of such regulation. This
may be based on various principles, all involving different
trade-offs—not discussed here because of space consid-
erations. To date, no detailed regulation for power tariff-
ing has been implemented in Norway, so grid tariffs have
been based on energy only (per kWh). Possible models
for power-based elements to the tariff (understood as ag-
gregated use by one consumer at any one time, or certain
times) include (based on Naper, Haugset, & Stene, 2016;
THEMA Counsulting Group, 2015a):
• Capacity-based tariffs based on the power (in
Watts) delivered from the grid. Sub-variants
include: subscribed power (where consumers
choose their power needs through subscription);
actual power use; depending on size of main fuse
(in Ampere);
• Time-of-use—where the tariffs vary depending on
time: typically the season or time of day;
• System needs/dynamic: tariffs change depending
on free capacity in the grid.
These models have different advantages and drawbacks
depending on whether the emphasis is put on the abil-
ity of the consumer to understand and actively relate to
the tariff scheme, orwhether it reflects the systemneeds
and represents a fair distribution. The conceptual hear-
ing in 2015 sketched out the above-mentioned concep-
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tual models in three versions, and received inputs on the
feasibility of these three, namely: 1) Actual power use;
2) fuse size (Amp) dependent tariff; and 3) subscribed
power use. In all, 57 hearing statements were received.
Again, these weremostly from grid companies and other
traditional electricity-sector actors, along with four pri-
vate individuals, and with Bellona, Friends of the Earth,
and Zero representing the NGO sector. The statements
underscored the importance of assessing and modifying
the grid tariff structure to reflect power use, and with
several alternatives presented for discussion. The grid
companies in particular noted that whereas demand for
electricity in general had declined slightly, the demand
for power—the simultaneous use of electricity in a many
locations—was rising. Power use is the deciding factor
for grid capacity; the grid companies noted that, as it is
expected to rise further, tariffing should reflect the cost
structure of the grid (NVE, 2016b).
The main point in many of the hearing statements
across a range of actors was the importance of es-
tablishing models that are easy for the consumer to
understand—in order to achieve the intended effect, and
for legitimacy. Many private consumers do not under-
stand the difference between power use (W—the com-
bined electricity use at any given time) and electricity use
(kWh—the total number of electricity units consumed).
Numerous considerations from the 57 responses dis-
cussed aspects of the different models but did little be-
yond noting the need to link grid development costs, use
of power, and consumer tariffs; and that the systemmust
be understandable. Feedback from grid companies sup-
ported variousmodels, althoughmost did not favour sub-
scribed power.
The hearing launched in 2017 with a deadline for
submissions early 2018 laid out a proposal for a grid
tariff based on subscribed capacity. The stated reasons
for proposing power-based tariffs were changes in con-
sumption patterns, system needs and not least cost dis-
tribution. The proposal described a model of subscribed
power where grid tariffs would consist of subscribed
effect (W per hour) + power used above subscription
(‘over use,’ at significantly higher cost) + grid loss (usu-
ally a default sum) (NVE, 2017). Here 81 statements were
submitted—again, mainly from grid companies, with the
remainder coming from organisations representing simi-
lar actors as in the previous hearings.
All grid companies (except Sognekraft) were highly
critical of the proposedmodel. Their main argument was
that it would be too complicated for private consumers
to understand—counter to what the NVE held—as well
as being seen as undermining the reputation of the grid
company as it did not send the right price signal. These
arguments were also invoked bymany electricity produc-
ers and traders.
Consumer groups, new entrants, NGOs and other
companies were basically negative, and for the
same reasons, although—like the electricity-sector
representatives—they supported a general power tariff.
However, the subscribed-effect model was held to need
further analysis before possible implementation andwas
seen as being too complicated for the end-users. The pro-
posal was later withdrawn; a new hearing was scheduled
for early 2020, but the results have yet to be evident at
the time of writing.
4. Discussion
Although electricity production in Norway is fully
renewables-based, there are several strong develop-
ment trends underway. This includes digitalisation and
diversification of production—all adding further pres-
sure on the regulatory regime, and with implications for
decentralisation. This provides a complex background for
the relevant hearings.
According to the organisational field perspective
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012), increasingly differing inter-
ests within the sector and new entrants with additional
perspectives and interests indicate a sector in crisis—or
at least headed in that direction. In a sector with signifi-
cant public ownership interests, both today and histor-
ically, one could expect more outright or vicarious re-
sistance, whether generally towards state programmes
like these three policies, or parts of the policy design.
Indeed, there are some elements of resistance as well—
for example, with the contested and (to my knowledge)
rather unique regulation of a 100 kWp feed-in limit to
the grid for prosuming. Another example involves under-
mining the power tariff in the shape of resistance, not
to the general idea of the tariff, but by various actors in-
volved in the process andmost of the proposed solutions
in the first hearings. This divergence in the perspectives
and apparent interests, and, in the larger picture, sup-
port or at least not manifest resistance to the changes,
gives further indications of a state of organisational field
crisis. This might have involved covert resistance by vi-
cariousmeans—but in that case, wewould expect to find
other indications aswell, for example practical resistance
to prosumer connections to the grid (Inderberg et al.,
2018). Notably, the NVE initiatives for a national regula-
tion steering full roll-out of smart meters, detailed pro-
sumer regulation, and demand-side management, were
generally supported across the organisations—either be-
cause resistance was not deemed feasible or because it
was not sufficiently in conflict with sector interests.
This is the main reason why Norway mandated na-
tionally controlled regulations where the alternatives
would have been looser regulation, opening up for
market-guided implementation of these. Indeed, large-
scale changes have been implemented before, with the
liberalisation of the sector in 1991 (Bye & Hope, 2002).
At the time, new phases of development and economic
efficiency reasons were driving factors behind the rad-
ical reform, which also brought in new kinds of ac-
tors who further boosted the reform (Inderberg, 2011).
Today, technological developments, external pressure,
and changes within the sector are driving factors for
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the state of crisis. Developments may take various di-
rections in terms of centralisation, control, and market
mechanisms—but, together with the NGOs, the new en-
trants in the electricity sector, representing fewer, more
mixed, and smaller companies tend to be more oriented
towards decentralisation in various forms.
These actors are challenging established practices
with new perspectives and alternative technical exper-
tise, and represent more niche activities by their plu-
ral business models relating to smart electricity services,
household and company-level distributed production.
The greater plurality in submissions in the later hearings
than in the earlier ones indicates that they are small but
getting stronger. One important area where an explicit
stand has been taken concerns allowing prosuming ac-
tivities in housing associations. As yet, these actors have
not achieved full acceptance for their view on shared
prosuming activities: Norwegian regulations still stipu-
late only one meter per end-user, and emplace strict re-
strictions on prosuming activities from multiple meters.
However, the ultimate prosuming regulation can be seen
as a success for this group—with some limitations, as
sketched out above.
Care should be taken not to interpret the find-
ings as indicating stable and general support from
the traditional electricity actors. The centralisation–
decentralisation dimension obfuscates important differ-
ences in the three policies involved, concerning con-
trol over the system decisions, ownership of the sys-
tem resources, and the physical structure of the sys-
tem. While the hearings show some general support
for steps towards decentralisation, the finer nuances of-
ten get lost in the hearing processes. Furthermore, in
the Norwegian system with traditionally low electricity
prices, weak solar incentives, dominated by flexible hy-
dropower (but with rising shares of wind power, includ-
ing foreign ownership), a prosuming explosion seems un-
likely. Therefore, decentralised production is often not
seen as a general threat, even though the NVE projec-
tions indicate ‘rapid growth of solar,’ with up to 7 TWh
as a reasonable potential for annual solar production by
2040, in a system that today produces about 156 TWh in
total (NVE, 2019, pp. 4, 21). Even such a level will have
an impact on the system.
As to possible pathway directions, all three policies
can be said to favour a more decentralised development
path. This is true of the smart-meter provision, because it
enables digitalisation and greater control over grid man-
agement, as well as demand-side responses, storage ser-
vices, new business models, and new types of collabora-
tion between traditional and newactors (Wadin, Ahlgren,
& Bengtsson, 2017). It also holds true of the prosuming
regulation, which opens for more decentralised produc-
tion and incentivises ‘self-consumption’—and lastly, the
power tariff, irrespective of the final outcome.
The degree of decentralisation can be evaluated
along various dimensions, including physical structure
of production and consumption, control, ownership,
and/or social aspects (Bauknecht et al., 2020). If poorly
designed, the power tariff may discriminate against stor-
age (Newbery, 2018); moreover, it can alienate or em-
power the end-user, depending on responses. However,
the policies studied here seem to provide greater oppor-
tunities for third-party actors and new energy service
companies. Electricity-consumer flexibility measures link
technologies that are key elements in integrating decen-
tralised generation (Judson et al., 2020). Trade-offs are
likely here. For example, smart meters provide oppor-
tunities for the power-based tariff (THEMA Consulting
Group, 2015a), likely to have advantages for the electric-
ity system and cost distribution, but they can negatively
influence the profitability of prosuming—at least, with-
out battery storage (Henden et al., 2017).
In sum, the three policies set the direction of digitali-
sation. This in turn can facilitate various technologies, en-
abling ordinary members of the public to become pro-
sumers. This again facilitates decentralised production
and promotes consumer flexibility as well as the integra-
tion of new technologies.
5. Conclusion: Norway’s Electricity-Sector Transitions
This study has examined why three specific anchoring
policies inNorway have been centrally coordinated,what
actors have had greatest influence over the policy, as
well as discussing possible implications of these regula-
tions for decentralisation of the electricity system. Using
an organisational field perspective, I have analysed the
official hearing submissions from main actor groups in
the official hearings for the smart-meter policy, the pro-
sumer provision, and the peak-power grid tariff scheme.
In accordance with the organisational field perspec-
tive, there are clear indications of a system in a state
of crisis. A field crisis often occurs when the established
structures, held in place by incumbent actors, become
challenged by external or internal events or new actors,
potentially leading to transitions and new stable states.
This is an apt description of the current situation in the
Norwegian electricity sector—with pressures from tech-
nological developments, developments in neighbouring
countries and the EU, and new actor groups in the sector.
The traditionally dominant group of grid companies
and their interest organisations certainly still hold key po-
sitions. However, their interests, indicated by the hear-
ing submissions for these three policies, have become in-
creasingly less unified since 2011. Higher fragmentation
is likely to yield reduced political influence. On the other
hand, despite important disparities regarding detailed
provisions, the grid companies did endorse the idea of
nationally determined regulations, with all three policies.
This was an important reason for adoption, with ultimate
decision on the power tariff still pending.
By contrast, while new entrants and the NGO group
were less influential in the hearings, general portions of
the policies under scrutiny do cater to their interests,
anchoring developments that move the system toward
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greater decentralisation. More local prosuming, with an
expected potential of 7 TWh solar by 2040, is likely to
have significant impact on the system. The policies en-
courage different dimensions of a developmental path
relating to digitalisation, production patterns, consumer
behaviour, and grid control. Although the policies anal-
ysed favour/disfavour further developments toward de-
centralised production, depending on the details, the
findings indicate that the centralisation–decentralisation
dichotomy offers a too-blunt perspective, unable to cap-
ture the nuances involved. Further elaborating the de-
centralisation aspects for dimensions like physical struc-
ture, ownership, and control may be needed to provide
nuancing so that transition pathway directions and their
implications become more apparent.
This study of the Norwegian case offers several
lessons. First, decentralizing initiatives in the energy sys-
tem can go hand in hand with centralized political steer-
ing. We have seen that nationally mandated initiatives,
with general endorsement from the incumbents, have
developed digitalisation and prosuming provisions that
may lead to increased decentralisation.
Second, this complexity underlines the fact that a
rough categorisation of actors into incumbents and new
entrants is not sufficiently fine-tuned: analysis of de-
centralisation requires significantly more refined cate-
gorisation and contextualisation to enable more pre-
cise predictions.
Last, energy transitions are complex. Transitioning in-
cludes several development paths, which may lead to
diverging interpretations. Even within the three policy
cases examined here, the implications for potential de-
centralisation developments are manifold, although we
may conclude that they represent steps in that direction.
Even in the absence of a driver for decarbon-
isation (Norwegian electricity production being fully
renewables-based), several different transitions are un-
derway. These forces are probably active also in less de-
carbonized electricity systems. This indicates that even
in countries where much of the policy drive is mandated
by a decarbonisation goal, more subtle drivers are likely
to exist—warranting contextualised, nuanced analysis to
clarify the developments and mechanisms influencing
these ongoing energy transitions, a keen attention to
pathway directionality complexities that includes a deep
understanding of inclusion of a variety of relevant ac-
tors, and the energy justice implications of the ongoing
changes. This article shows that incumbents are involved
in driving the transition, but the implications of a more
decentralised system for incumbents as well as other
stakeholders, requires further investigation.
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